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potential determinants. Barriers such as minimum account and loan balances, account fees and 
documentation requirements are negatively correlated with outreach and these barriers exclude a 
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associated with financial depth such as the effectiveness of credit information sharing, creditor 
rights and contract enforcement are highly correlated with barriers, but so are non-financial 
factors such as the development of the infrastructure and the extent of media freedom.  More 
competitive banking systems and market-based supervisory policies are associated with lower 
barriers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, government banks are not associated with lower 
access barriers.  Instead, bank customers face higher barriers to credit services in banking 
systems which are predominantly government-owned, while a larger share of foreign bank 
ownership is associated with lower barriers in deposit services.   
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1.  Introduction 
Over 700 dollars are required to open an account in Cameroon, an amount higher than the 
GDP per capita of that country. On the other hand, no minimum amounts are required in South 
Africa or Swaziland.  Fees to maintain a checking account exceed 25 percent of GDP per capita 
in Sierra Leone, while there are no such fees in the Philippines.  The fees for transferring 250 
dollars internationally are 50 dollars in the Dominican Republic, but only 30 cents in Belgium.  
While most people in the developed world take access to banking services for granted, price and 
non-price barriers prevent large parts of the population in developing countries from accessing 
and using formal banking services. These fees observed in many countries may effectively 
prevent the poor from using checking or savings accounts. Similarly, the requirement of a 
physical address or of a formal sector job as eligibility criteria to open an account excludes the 
majority of people in many developing countries, where a large percentage of the population 
lives in rural areas and works in the informal sector. 
This paper presents new indicators of barriers to bank access and use of banking services 
around the world, shows their significance for outreach and relates them to bank and country 
characteristics suggested by theory as potential determinants.   First, through surveying the 
largest banks in 62 countries, we document the extent of barriers to three banking services - 
deposit, loan and payments - across three dimensions - physical access, affordability, and 
eligibility. Second, we show that our barrier indicators are negatively correlated with measures 
of outreach and document that barriers can potentially exclude large percentages of the 
population from using banking services.  Third, we explore which bank and country 
characteristics are associated with these barriers.  Our findings have important implications for 
policies to broaden access.  2 
 
Market frictions such as transaction costs and information asymmetries give rise to 
financial institutions and markets (see Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, 
Boyd and Prescott 1986). These market frictions, however, can also limit the extent to which 
financial institutions can reach out to clients and provide access to different services. Transaction 
costs that to a large extent are independent of the size of the financial transaction – deposit, loan 
or payment – make outreach to clients with demand for small transactions costly.  High 
information asymmetries and the resulting agency problems make outreach to opaque clients 
again more difficult and costly.  Barriers such as high minimum account balances and fees, 
multiple documentation requirements and high payment fees might reflect high transaction costs 
and the contractual and business environment in which banks operate.  However, they might also 
reflect the competitive pressures, regulatory framework, and the availability of physical 
infrastructure in the market where banks offer their services.   
Theory suggests that financial market frictions that prevent broad access can be the 
critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality or poverty traps (Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993). While a large empirical literature has established the 
importance of banking sector depth for GDP per capita growth, productivity growth, poverty, 
firm growth and entry rates (Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan, 2007), much less is known about the determinants and implications of access to financial 
services by individuals and firms.  This is because data on who has access to which financial 
services remain thin and inadequate.  This paper contributes to closing this gap in the literature. 
Our data show substantial cross-bank and cross-country variation in barriers to banking. 
While banks in 18 countries do not impose any minimum balances for checking accounts, such 
balances are higher than 10 percent of GDP per capita in 15 countries. While one document is  3 
 
needed to open an account in Albania, Czech Republic, Mozambique, Spain and Sweden, at least 
four documents, including ID, payment slip, proof of domicile and reference letter, are required 
in Bangladesh, Cameron, Chile, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zambia, 
effectively preventing large parts of the population from accessing these services. While it is 
possible to apply for a loan over the phone or the Internet in Australia, Chile, Denmark, Greece, 
South Africa and Spain, customers can only submit loan applications at bank headquarters or at 
branches in Armenia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Uganda.  
We conduct consistency checks on our data and show that, in general, barriers to banking 
are lower in economically and financially developed economies. Barriers are also negatively 
correlated with financial outreach – measured by branches, loans and deposits per capita and an 
estimate of the share of the adult population with access to financial services – and positively 
correlated with financing obstacles as reported by firms.  However, we also show that some 
barriers seem to be more constraining than others. Specifically, we find that the fees on 
consumer and SME loans relative to GDP per capita are not consistently correlated with 
outreach.  Similarly, the fees associated with international wire transfers and the use of ATM 
cards seem orthogonal to most other outreach indicators.  On the other hand, minimum balances 
for checking and savings accounts, annual fees and documentation requirements associated with 
these accounts, the number of delivery channels for lending products, minimum loan amounts for 
SME and consumer loans relative to GDP per capita, and the days to process consumer and SME 
loans are highly correlated with other outreach measures and thus seem to constitute true hurdles 
to accessing formal banking services.  
While double-digit ratios of minimum balances, fees and minimum loan amounts to GDP 
per capita already give a first impression of the limited affordability of many of these services for 
large parts of the population in a number of countries, we offer back-of-the-envelope calculations  4 
 
using data on income distribution. We find that fees to maintain checking accounts effectively 
prevent more than 30 percent of the population from using such services in ten of the 62 
countries in our sample.  
Barriers to banking services could in principle arise as a result of banks’ rational business 
decisions based on their business model, their market position, the macroeconomic, contractual 
and regulatory environment in which they operate and the level of competition they face. We 
explore the association between our barrier indicators and several bank and country 
characteristics that proxy for the business model and macroeconomic, contractual and regulatory 
frameworks to understand which policies might be more effective at reducing these barriers.  We 
find that bank size and thus economies of scale are an important factor explaining barriers.   
Factors traditionally associated with the development of the financial sector such as upgrading 
credit registries and improving the contractual framework are associated with lower barriers 
mostly in terms of deposit services but, surprisingly, less for lending services. In addition, non-
financial factors such as having an efficient infrastructure and free media are also strongly 
associated with lower barriers.   We also find more competitive banking systems and market-
based supervisory policies are associated with lower barriers. Finally, contrary to conventional 
wisdom, government banks are not associated with lower access barriers.  Instead, bank 
customers face higher barriers to credit services in banking systems which are predominantly 
government-owned, while a larger share of foreign bank ownership is associated with lower 
barriers in deposit services.   
This paper is related to an emerging literature on access to financial services. Most of the 
existing research and the efforts underway focus on country case studies that aim at measuring 
and analyzing access to financial services at the household or firm level (see Claessens, 2006; 
Claessens and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). Few papers study this issue by focusing directly on  5 
 
banking services providers. Recently, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) present 
aggregate cross-country data on banking sector outreach (such as branch and ATM penetration, 
deposits per capita, and loans per capita) and show that these indicators closely track more 
difficult and costly to collect micro-level statistics of household and firm use of banking 
services.  More directly related to our paper, Genesis (2005a) examines the costs of using bank 
accounts in seven countries - Brazil, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
However, in contrast to our study, this report focuses exclusively on deposit service affordability 
in a small number of countries. 
While our paper is the first systematic effort to document and analyze banking barriers 
across countries, it has a number of limitations. First, our attempt to compare standard products 
across a broad sample of countries is limited by differences in financial practices.  For example, 
while in some countries checking accounts are the prevalent form of transaction account, in other 
countries savings accounts might be preferred. Furthermore, even the same type of financial 
product, e.g., an SME loan, might have different definitions and features across banks and 
countries. We therefore assess barriers on somewhat different deposit and loan products. 
However, to the extent that standardized products are not offered across countries, it is difficult 
to overcome this problem.
1 Second, fees and charges might differ because of differences in the 
scope and quality of the services provided rather than because of differences in pricing strategies. 
Third, we focus on the largest banks, not on the whole banking system. While this seems a 
restriction, by focusing on the largest banks with the most wide-spread branching structure we 
capture the barriers encountered by a majority of customers in a country. Finally, our survey 
focuses exclusively on banks and hence our data cannot reflect the extent of barriers to the use of 
non-bank financial institutions, such as postal savings banks, finance companies and 
                                                 
1 We also considered asking questions on standardized loans and deposits, yet decided to collect information on 
actual barriers as opposed to “hypothetical” ones based on products that might not exist in all countries.  6 
 
microfinance institutions. While these limitations suggest potential areas of further improvement, 
we see this paper as an important first step in the effort to create consistent cross-country 
indicators of barriers that households and firms face in accessing financial services. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the survey used 
to collect bank-level information.  Section 3 presents the indicators and discusses their cross-
country variation. Section 4 shows that these barriers are correlated with cross-country indicators 
of outreach and firms’ financing obstacles and section 5 offers back-of-the-envelope calculations 
that show the impact of some of these barriers on access. Section 6 relates our indicators to bank 
and country characteristics associated with the institutional, contractual and, competitive 
environment, and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The survey 
The dataset is constructed from a web-based survey with 75 questions that was sent to the 
five most important banks in 115 countries in 2004 and 2005, identified based on their total asset 
size or branches.
2  We chose to focus on the largest banks with wide-spread branching networks 
since we are interested in the barriers encountered by the average customer in each country. 
Survey responses were carefully confirmed through extensive follow-up with the banks 
whenever we had questions about the data provided.  While we received a total of 257 responses 
from banks in 88 countries, to insure representativeness, we limited the analysis in this paper to 
countries for which the responding banks constitute at least 30 percent of the market in terms of 
                                                 
2 Data collected from bank regulators and analyzed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) indicates that on average 
the five largest banks in over 100 countries account for 73 percent of bank assets and deposits.  7 
 
total loans or total deposits, or economies where we received a response from the largest bank.
3  
This gives us a total sample of 209 banks across 62 countries.   
  Table 1 presents all the countries in our sample and shows their level of economic and 
financial development, as measured by GDP per capita in U.S. dollars and private credit to GDP, 
respectively. Also, the table contains information on the number of banks (out of the top 5 banks) 
that responded to our survey, along with the market share they represent. Our sample comprises 
countries across all levels of financial and economic development. Countries range from 
Ethiopia with a GDP per capita close to 100 dollars to Switzerland, where GDP per capita 
exceeds 34,000 dollars. With banking sector credit at 2 percent of GDP, Mozambique is the 
country with the lowest level of financial development in our sample, while Denmark and 
Switzerland rank at the top with private sector credit exceeding 150 percent of GDP. In terms of 
regions, our sample coverage is also quite balanced. Our dataset includes 15 countries from 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 14 countries from sub-Saharan Africa, 9 countries in Western 
Europe, 9 Latin American and Caribbean countries, 5 countries from the Middle East and North 
Africa, 5 countries in South Asia, 4 countries in East Asia and one non-European developed 
country (Australia).  
  In terms of market share, for 60 out of the 62 countries in our sample the share of 
deposits captured by respondents exceeds 30 percent. Banks from France and Zimbabwe are not 
included in the calculations for deposit and payment barrier indicators because the market share 
of bank respondents in these countries is below the 30 percent threshold. When it comes to loans, 
the share represented by bank respondents exceeds 30 percent in 57 countries. In this case, the 
countries excluded from the sample are Germany, Nigeria, Romania, Swaziland, and Sweden. In 
                                                 
3 We determined the market share using data from Bankscope.  We have data for the largest bank constituting less 
than 30% of the market in only one country, Swaziland, but this ratio is 29%. In Algeria too, we only have data for 
the largest bank, but this bank accounts for more than 30% of the market.  8 
 
32 (28) countries the share of deposits (loans) exceeds 50 percent. On average across countries, 
the banks that responded to our sample account for 55 percent of the deposits and 52 percent of 
the loans in the countries in our sample, based on data from Bankscope.  
 
3. The indicators 
This section presents our indicators of barriers to banking across countries. Tables 2, 3 
and 4 present country-level averages including descriptive statistics and Figures 1 through 16 
show the cross-country variation graphically.
4 Table 5 reports correlations across the different 
barrier indicators. We separate our indicators based on the type of service: deposit, loan and 
payments. We report averages for each country calculated by weighing each banks’ responses by 
their share of deposits in total deposits of all sampled banks in the case of indicators for deposit 
and payment barriers, and by the share of loans for indicators of loan barriers.  Also, wherever 
possible, we try to distinguish between three different service dimensions: physical access, 
affordability, and eligibility. Physical access refers to the points of service delivery. Greater 
physical access means services are delivered in multiple and more convenient ways. 
Affordability refers to the costs in terms of minimum balances and fees that bank clients need to 
pay to obtain financial services, such as checking or savings accounts, consumer or SME loans, 
international payment transfers and use of ATM cards. Finally, eligibility refers to the criteria (in 
terms of documentation or other requirements) that determine who can access financial services 
and who cannot. In the case of lending, we use the days needed to process a loan application as 
an eligibility criterion since some potential bank customers might not apply for loans if they need 
financing urgently and they know it takes a long time to get a decision. 
 
                                                 
4 We do not report and graph the indicators for Swaziland or Algeria, as they represent only one bank.  Nevertheless, 
these banks do enter the subsequent analysis.  9 
 
3.1. Deposit services 
The main deposit products we consider in terms of deposit services are the checking and 
savings accounts. Across countries, there are differences in the extent to which savings or 
checking accounts are the dominant transaction account type. We therefore assess barriers to 
deposit services based on survey questions related to both account types.  Potential customers 
can encounter barriers to the use of deposit services in terms of the need to visit headquarters to 
open an account instead of doing it at the local bank branch or a non-branch office (physical 
access), payment of high minimum balances and fees (affordability), and the requirement to 
present multiple documents to open an account (eligibility). We will discuss each of these 
barriers in turn. Weighted country-level averages are presented in Table 2.  
 
Physical access 
Physical access to banking services can often be hampered by long distances from the 
next bank outlet (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007).  However, even if there is a 
sufficiently wide network of bank offices, not all of these offices might offer the same services.  
We measure physical access in deposit services by considering the locations to open a deposit 
account. This indicator takes values from 1 to 3 depending on whether an account can be opened 
at headquarters only (1), at headquarters or a branch (2) or at headquarters, branches or a non-
branch office (3).
5 While the majority of sampled banks in Greece and Sierra Leone require 
customers to visit the head office to open a checking account, customers in Moldova can open 
such an account at headquarters, branches and even branch-like offices.  Overall, we find   
                                                 
5 We consider only the most local office, i.e. banks that allow customers to open an account at a branch or a non-
branch office receive the same rating (3) as banks that allow customers to open an account at headquarters, a branch 
or a non-branch office.  10 
 
substantial variation in the locations to open a deposit account (Figure 1).  In the median country, 
customers can open accounts at headquarters or branches but not at non-branch offices. 
 
Affordability 
We characterize the affordability of deposit services across countries by looking at the 
minimum balances required to open checking and savings accounts, along with the fees needed 
to maintain such accounts. There is substantial variation in the ratio of the minimum balance 
needed to open a checking account to GDP per capita (Figure 2). While in Cameroon and 
Nigeria, the minimum balance exceeds 100 percent and in Ethiopia, Nepal, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda, more than 50 percent of per capita income is required to open a checking account, the 
amount is zero in 18 countries, less than half of which are developed.
6 The median value for this 
indicator is 0.98 percent and the average is 12.27 percent. While some of the variation in this 
indicator might be explained by the denominator – GDP per capita – the correlation between the 
amount necessary to open an account and GDP per capita is far from perfect (-0.29) and even in 
dollar terms, there is a significant variation in minimum balances.  
The ratio of the minimum balance needed to open a savings account to GDP per 
capita (Figure 3) ranges from zero in nine countries (i.e., Australia, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, 
Egypt, Israel, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey) to over 40 percent in Cameroon, Kenya, Nepal, 
Sierra Leone and Uganda. The median value for this indicator is 1.2 percent. The required 
minimum balance to open a savings account is on average only slightly below the minimum 
balance in checking accounts, 9 percent for the former compared to 12.3 percent of GDP per 
capita for the latter.  
                                                 
6 Countries for which the minimum balance to open a checking account averages  zero include: Australia, Belarus, 
Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Lithuania, Malawi, Moldova, South Africa, Spain, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Zambia.   11 
 
As reported in Table 2, there is similar variation across countries in the balances that have 
to be maintained in checking and savings accounts. Thus, the affordability barriers expand 
beyond the initial stage of opening a checking or savings account.  There is a high correlation 
between the amounts needed to open and to maintain checking and savings accounts, although 
on average, the amounts are significantly lower to maintain than to open an account, 5 percent 
and 7.3 percent of GDP per capita for checking and savings accounts, respectively.
7  
Fees associated with maintaining a checking or savings account also vary 
significantly across countries (Figures 4 and 5).  While in Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Uganda 
checking account fees amount to over 20 percent of GDP per capita, these accounts are free in 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Ethiopia, India, Jordan, Malta, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sweden. The 
median value for the fees associated with checking accounts is 0.3 percent and the average is 2.5 
percent. Savings accounts fees are significantly lower than those associated with checking 
accounts, ranging from zero in 28 countries to almost 4 percent of GDP per capita in Malawi and 
Uganda.  The average value across countries for the fees on savings account is 0.5 percent while 
the median is 0.01 percent.  
 
Eligibility 
Around the world, banks demand proof of identification to open an account for a new 
client.  However, banks in many countries demand a variety of other documents on top of ID 
cards, including recommendation letters, wage slips, and proof of domicile.  To quantify these 
eligibility requirements, we create indicators of the number of documents required to open 
checking and savings accounts, respectively. While banks in Albania, Czech Republic, 
Mozambique, Spain and Sweden demand on average only one document to open a checking 
                                                 
7 Given the high correlation between minimum balances to open and to maintain accounts, we will focus on the 
minimum balances to open an account in the subsequent analysis.  12 
 
account, banks in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chile, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, and Zambia require at least four documents (Figure 6). On average, a slightly smaller 
number of documents are required to open a savings account (2.2) relative to a checking account 
(2.6). In 9 out of 52 countries for which information is available on the number of documents 
needed to open a savings account, only one type of document is required.
8 On the other hand, 
more than three documents are needed in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Ghana, Malta, Nepal, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia (Figure 7). 
 
3.2. Credit services 
We collected indicators of physical access, affordability and eligibility for four different 
loan types – business, SME, consumer, and mortgage loans. However, due to space constraints 
and because of our interest in products available to individuals and to typically constrained 
smaller firms, we focus on consumer and SME loans (see Table 3).  Nevertheless we report 
indicators on the other loan types in Appendix Table A.1. Indicators of physical access, 




To measure physical access for loans, we examine the locations to submit a loan 
application. While customers in Armenia, Ethiopia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Thailand, and Uganda 
can only apply for loans at a bank’s headquarters and branches, customers in Australia, Chile, 
Denmark, Greece, South Africa and Spain not only can use branch and non-branch outlets, but 
also submit loan applications over the phone and the Internet (Figure 8). In the median and 
                                                 
8 These countries include: Albania, Belarus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Mozambique, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
and Sweden.  13 
 




We measure loan affordability by looking at the minimum balances required for 
consumer and SME loans and at the fees for these loans. The minimum amount for consumer 
loans relative to GDP per capita ranges from less than 1 percent in Denmark and Switzerland 
to 1,152 percent of GDP per capita in Nepal (see Figure 9). The median minimum amount for 
consumer loans is 19.3 percent, while the average is 76.9 percent. While banks in Belarus, 
Denmark, and Egypt do not specify minimum amounts for SME loans, banks in Nepal, 
Georgia, and Uganda report a minimum of over 2,000 percent of GDP per capita (Figure 10). 
The average minimum amount for SME loans is 408.4 percent and the median is 58 percent of 
GDP per capita. Existence of high minimum loan requirements suggests that in those countries 
banks do not meet the external financing needs of poorer households and smaller enterprises. 
Fees on consumer loans expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita range from zero 
in Belgium, Ethiopia, and Switzerland to over 6 percent in Albania and Cameroon (Figure 11). 
The median fee on consumer loans is 1.3 percent and the average is 1.6 percent. Fees on SME 
loans also exhibit a significant cross-country variation. Fees vary from zero in Armenia and 
Switzerland to close to over 80 percent in Cameron (Figure 12). The average fee on SME loans 





                                                 
9 We also computed loan fees relative to the minimum loan amount. Comparing loan fees relative to GDP per capita 
and relative to the minimum loan amount yields a very high rank correlation.  14 
 
Eligibility 
  A crucial function of financial intermediaries is to screen borrowers.  The number of 
days it takes to process a loan application can be perceived as a de facto eligibility barrier, 
since some borrowers might be discouraged from applying for bank loans and seek financing 
elsewhere to avoid long waiting periods. For consumer loans, this indicator ranges from almost 
one day in Australia, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark,  Greece, Israel and Spain to over 20 
days in Pakistan (see Figure 13). The average number of days to process a consumer loan 
application is 4 and the median is closer to 3.  
  SME loan application are processed in less than 2 days in Denmark, Israel, and Spain but 
take more than one month to process in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines and Uruguay (Figure 
14). Across countries, it takes an average of almost 11 days to process an SME loan application. 
The median number of days is 8. 
 
3.3. Payment services 
Our indicators on payment services measure primarily affordability. We examine the 
costs of transferring a small amount of funds internationally and the fees associated with using 
ATM cards (see Table 4).
10  
The cost of transferring funds internationally varies from 0.12 percent in Belgium to 
20 percent in the Dominican Republic (Figure 15).
11  To compute these ratios and to make them 
comparable across countries, we focus on a typical transfer of 250 dollars.  On average, the cost 
of transferring funds internationally is 6.3 percent or $ 15.82. 
                                                 
10 Though ATM cards can be used for transactions such as transferring funds across accounts, we think of ATMs as 
primarily facilitating payments by allowing the withdrawal of funds. 
11 While we also considered the speed of transfers in terms of days, we found little variation across banks and 
countries.  15 
 
We express the fees associated with ATM transactions as a percentage of 100 dollars. 
We find that ATM fees are above 40 cents for Pakistan and Nigeria, and average 10 cents across 
countries while the use of ATM is free for 50 percent of the sample (Figure 16).   
 
3.4. Correlations 
Table 5 shows the pairwise correlations between the different barrier indicators, averaged 
at the country level.  Most of the variables are significantly correlated with each other, although 
the correlations are stronger among indicators of the same type of service (deposit, loan or 
payment) than between indicators across the different services.  
Among deposit service indicators, we find that banks in countries with high minimum 
balances for checking accounts also require high minimum balances for savings account, as 
expected.  Similarly, fees and documentation requirements for checking accounts are highly 
correlated with those for savings account. Also, higher fees are positively correlated with higher 
minimum checking and savings deposit balances required to open deposit accounts. Finally, in 
countries with high deposit fees and high minimum balances, prospective depositors are also 
required to present a larger number of documents to open accounts.  
Loan indicators are also correlated with each other but to a lesser extent than is the case 
among deposit indicators. SME and consumer loan fees are significantly correlated with each 
other and so are the loan minimum balances and the days to process SME and consumer loan 
applications. The indicator on the number of locations/ways in which a potential borrower can 
submit a loan application is negatively correlated with the loan minimum balances and the 
number of days to process loan applications. Among the payment service indicators, the cost to 
transfer funds internationally is positively correlated with the fees associated with using ATM 
cards.  16 
 
Across the three different types of services, we find that countries with higher minimum 
loan amounts also tend to have higher minimum deposit amounts and, in the case of consumer 
loans, also higher checking fees. Further, we observe that higher loan fees are correlated with 
higher costs of transferring funds internationally. 
 
4. Barriers to banking and outreach 
  In this section we explore the association between our barrier indicators and existing 
measures of economic development, financial depth, and banking sector outreach (Table 6). In 
many ways, examining these correlations represents a consistency check on our indicators and 
allows us to assess which barriers are actually constraining, in the sense that they are correlated 
with less banking sector outreach.   
   As expected, we find that barriers to banking are negatively correlated with economic 
development. Specifically, minimum balances to open accounts and fees to maintain them, the 
number of documents to open accounts, minimum amounts of consumer and SME loans, and the 
days to process consumer and SME loans are negatively and significantly correlated with GDP 
per capita. In the same way, we find that the number of places to submit loan applications, an 
indicator of lower barriers to physical loan access, is positively and significantly correlated with 
GDP per capita.   
  Further, we find that higher barriers are consistently negatively associated with financial 
development.  Table 6 shows that private credit to GDP – a standard measure of financial 
intermediary development – is negatively and significantly correlated with the minimum 
balances to open accounts, the annual fee and the documents to open checking accounts, the 
minimum amount for consumer and SME loans, and the days to process SME and consumer 
loans. On the other hand, private credit to GDP is positively and significantly correlated with the  17 
 
number of locations to submit loan applications.  Interestingly, the fees on consumer and SME 
loans, the cost to transfer internationally, the fee for using the ATM card and the locations to 
open deposit accounts are not significantly correlated with economic or financial development.   
One explanation for this lack of significance could be that countries at low levels of economic 
and financial development are leapfrogging using the same alternative delivery channels and 
cheaper technology to provide deposit and ATM services as more developed countries.  
To gauge the relationship between barriers and aggregate measures of financial sector 
outreach, we utilize recently compiled data on branch penetration, the number of loan and 
deposit accounts per capita (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007) and a synthetic 
indicator of the proportion of adult population with access to a financial account estimated using 
existing household surveys and information on accounts from banks, cooperatives and MFIs 
(Honohan, 2007).   These are country-level indicators, compiled from regulatory surveys and 
publicly available information. We would expect countries with banks that impose higher 
barriers on their customers to have fewer numbers of branches, deposit and loan accounts per 
capita and an overall lower share of adult population with access to financial accounts. 
  The correlations in Table 6 suggest that lower barriers are indeed associated with greater 
outreach. Specifically, banks in countries with a higher demographic branch penetration demand 
lower minimum balances and fewer documents to open accounts, are more likely to accept loan 
applications in branch-like offices or over the phone or Internet, set lower minimum SME loan 
amounts, are quicker at processing loan applications, and charge lower fees for using ATM 
cards.  Similarly, banks in countries with higher loans per capita are more likely to accept these 
applications outside headquarters, in particular, through non-traditional channels such as phone 
or Internet, and take fewer days to process SME applications. Banks in countries with more 
deposits per capita demand lower minimum balances and lower fees, require fewer documents to  18 
 
open such an account, set lower minimum amounts for consumer and SME loans, charge lower 
fees for consumer loans, are faster in processing loans, are more likely to accept loan 
applications through non-traditional channels, and charge lower fees for using ATMs. Finally, 
barriers to access and use of banking services are correlated with estimates of the share of adults 
with access to an account (deposit or loan) at a financial institution. We find that the share of 
adults with access to a financial account is higher in countries where banks demand lower 
minimum balances and fees on savings and checking accounts, where they demand fewer 
documents to open such accounts, where the consumer and SME minimum loan amount is lower, 
where loans are processed more quickly, where loan applicants are more likely to be able to use 
non-traditional channels, and where ATM fees are lower. Surprisingly, the possibility of using 
non-branch office to open accounts is negatively correlated with this financial breadth measure, 
which could indicate that technological advances such as e-finance or m-finance may be 
substituting for and expanding access despite limitations in physical locations. 
Higher barriers are also associated with higher financing obstacles as reported by firms.  
We use responses to firm-level survey questions on “Is access to financing (e.g. collateral) a 
problem to the operation and growth of your enterprise?” and “Is cost of financing (e.g. interest 
rates) a problem to the operation and growth of your enterprise?” from the Investment Climate 
Assessment (ICA) surveys conducted by the World Bank across 38 (access) and 39 (cost) 
countries. Responses to these questions are coded between zero (no obstacle) to four (very severe 
obstacle), with higher values thus indicating more severe financing constraints.
12  We take the 
average across all firms in a country.  We find that firms report higher financing obstacles in 
countries where banks impose higher minimum amounts to open checking and savings accounts 
and charge higher fees to maintain these accounts, and where banks do not accept loan 
                                                 
12 There is a growing literature that shows the importance of financing obstacles for firm growth and financing 
patterns (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2006).   19 
 
applications through non-traditional channels.  Finally, firms report higher financing obstacles in 
countries where banks demand a larger number of documents to open bank accounts.  It is 
interesting to note that firms’ financing obstacles are more significantly correlated with barriers 
related to deposit services than with barriers related to payment or loan services.  This suggests 
that firms rely to a large extent not only on credit services, but on a whole array of financial 
services from financial institutions.  
These correlations are simply that – correlations. They do not imply causality.  They 
suggest that barriers to banking go hand in hand with less physical access to banking offices and 
lower use of deposit and credit services by households and firms.   However, they also show that 
some of our indicators capture barriers more effectively than others. Minimum account balances 
and account fees, minimum loan amounts, documentation requirements, reduced number of 
delivery channels for loan products and lengthy loan processing times seem to be significant 
barriers to access banking services as documented in lower financial sector penetration rates.   
Loan fees as well as fees for international wire transfers and the use of ATM cards and 
geographic access barriers to opening deposit accounts are either not significant  barriers because 
they can be circumvented through technological advances and other means or they are not 
properly measured with our methodology, as they are not correlated with lower financial sector 
penetration rates.   
 
5.  Financial exclusion – the effects of banking barriers  
  This section provides back-of-the-envelope calculations of the effects of barriers in terms 
of the percentage of the population in a country that cannot afford banking services.   
Specifically, we combine income and income distribution data with our information on annual 
fees to maintain checking and savings accounts to compute the share of the population that does  20 
 
not earn enough to afford using checking and saving accounts (see methodological explanation 
in the appendix). Using the latest income distribution data from UNU-WIDER (2005), we utilize 
information on the Gini coefficient to compute percentiles of income distribution and combine 
this with income data to compute income per capita data at different percentiles of the income 
distribution.
13 If we follow Genesis (2005b) and assume that poor people cannot afford to spend 
more than 2 percent of their annual household income on financial services, these calculations 
provide us with a cut-off percentile of a country’s income distribution below which the use of 
checking and saving accounts is not affordable.
 14   We adjust income with the average household 
size for every country.
15    
Table 7 shows that while in terms of fees, checking and savings accounts are affordable 
for almost the entire population in many countries, there are significant outliers. In ten countries 
at least 30 percent of the population cannot afford checking accounts and in Nepal as well as 
several African countries, more than 50 percent of the population is priced-out of using these 
services.  Specifically, 54 percent of the population in Cameroon, 81 percent in Kenya, 40 
percent in Madagascar, 94 percent in Malawi, 56 percent in Nepal, 89 percent in Sierra Leone 
and 93 percent in Uganda cannot afford the fees for checking accounts. The fees on savings 
accounts are in general less restrictive. Approximately, 34 percent of the population in Nepal, 33 
percent of the population in Malawi and Uganda, and 17 percent of the Bolivian population 
cannot afford the fees and charges associated with a savings account. 
                                                 
13 Calculations are based on Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Lopez and Serven (2006).  
14 According to Genesis (2005b), the 2% limit is based on unpublished research by the South African Universal 
Services Agency in the context of mandated rolling-out of telecom service to lower-income families.  As both 
financial transaction accounts and telecom service can be considered network products, similar assumptions on 
affordability for both services seem reasonable. 
15 Household size is expected to vary with income level within countries.  As we do not have data available on 
household size distribution, we are not able to adjust for this effect.  Again, our numbers are indicative and a more 
detailed analysis would require richer country-level information on the variation of household size distribution with 
income distribution.  21 
 
  While these computations are rough estimates and the 2 percent cut-off may not 
necessarily apply, they are still most likely conservative estimates of the share of the population 
that cannot afford these services, as we do not take into account the costs imposed by minimum 
balances, restricted locations to access services, and documentation requirements.  As detailed by 
Genesis (2005b), it is especially documentation requirements that prevent the large majority of 
the population in many Sub-Saharan African countries who do not hold formal sector jobs, live 
in rural areas without registered addresses and do not have IDs or passports from accessing 
financial services.  
 
6. What explains banking barriers across banks and countries? 
Theory suggests that barriers to banking are the results of banks’ rational business 
decisions based on their business model, their market position, the macroeconomic, contractual 
and regulatory environment in which they operate and the competitive pressures they face 
(Berger and Udell, 2006; Beck and de la Torre, 2007). The standard deviation of the barrier 
indicators is about as large across banks within countries as it is across countries, which suggests 
that both bank as well as country characteristics drive the variation in barriers. This section 
therefore explores the empirical association between our barrier indicators and an array of bank 
and country variables. In particular, we consider whether the size, business orientation and 
ownership of the banks are associated with barriers and explore the role of physical 
infrastructure, the contractual and informational frameworks, banking sector market structure, 
regulatory policies and transparency in the economy in explaining cross-country variation in 
these barriers.  While bank-level data are from Bankscope, country-level variables are drawn 
from different databases.
16  Appendix Table A.2 shows definitions and sources for the 
                                                 
16 Bank ownership data are from Micco, Panizza and Yañez (2007), based on Bankscope data.  22 
 
explanatory variables included in the analysis and Tables A.3 and A.4 present descriptive 
statistics and correlations for all explanatory variables.  
To assess the relationship between barriers and bank- and country-level characteristics, 
we utilize the following regression model  
Fi,k =α 0 + α 1 Bi + α 2 Ck + ε i,k  ,                     (1) 
where F is one of the barriers indicators for bank i in country k, B is a matrix of bank-level 
variables (the log of total assets in U.S. dollars, dummy variables for government and foreign 
ownership and the loan to asset ratio), and C is a country-level variable. While we include all 
bank variables in our regressions, we include only one country-level variable at a time given the 
limited number of countries in our sample and the high correlation between our variables 
(Appendix Table A.4).  Critically, we do not control for GDP per capita because many of our 
explanatory country-level variables are highly correlated with economic development.  Also, we 
are interested primarily in knowing which components of economic development can explain 
cross-country variations in barriers, as captured by individual country characteristics. While our 
analysis is conducted at the bank-level, we confirm our findings using simple correlations 
between the weighted country-level averages of the barriers and the country characteristics.  
  We utilize different estimation techniques depending on the nature of the dependent 
variable.  Specifically, for all affordability indicators – constructed as minimum amounts and 
fees relative to GDP per capita-, we conduct OLS regressions of  the log of one plus the variable 
– to account for the skewed distribution of these variables. Similarly, for the days to process 
loans and documentation requirements to open an account, we use OLS regressions.  For the 
location variables (both for loans and deposits) capturing physical access, we utilize ordered 
probit estimations to take account of the polychotomous nature of these variables with natural 
order. In all cases, we drop the top one percent of the distribution of the dependent variables to  23 
 
control for outliers. The first four rows of Table 8 report the results of a regression on just the 
bank-level variables, while all subsequent rows report the results of adding the country-level 
variables one at a time. 
 
Bank characteristics 
Theory provides opposing views on the impact of bank size and ownership types, on 
barriers.  On the one hand, large banks might be better at exploiting scale economies, thus 
overcoming more easily the problem of smallness faced by financial systems in large parts of the 
developing world which have clients with demand for small and few transactions and have few 
customers over which fixed transaction costs can be spread (Beck and de la Torre, 2007). On the 
other hand, by virtue of their size, small banks might be closer and better able to serve “smaller” 
and riskier clients (Berger, Hasan and Klapper, 2004).   
While the public-interest theory (Gerschenkron, 1962) justifies the creation of 
government-owned banks with the necessity to target small and riskier clients ignored by private 
financial institutions, a large theoretical and empirical literature suggests a mission drift of these 
banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002), with both views having opposing 
implications for the barriers imposed by government-owned banks.  Similarly, while foreign-
owned banks are assumed to be more interested in large corporations and private clients with 
demand for large transactions due to their limited access to soft local information (Mian, 2006), 
they might have more efficient technologies, which allows them to lower cost and thus barriers 
(Berger and Udell, 2006).  And even if they may not serve the smaller clients themselves, the 
competitive pressures they create may provide incentives for the domestic banks to do so, hence 
leading to lower barriers (Rajan, 2006).  24 
 
We measure the size of banks with the log of total assets in millions of US dollars, and 
control for their ownership type with separate dummy variables for majority government- and 
foreign-owned banks.
17  Finally, we explore the impact of banks’ the business orientation using 
the loan-asset ratio as a proxy for the degree to which banks serve retail clients (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007). We conjecture that banks with a retail orientation will impose lower barriers to 
attract a larger number of smaller clients, while wholesale or corporate banks might place higher 
barriers to signal their lack of interest in such type of clients. 
Our results suggest that larger banks demand lower minimum balances to open a 
checking or savings account, charge lower checking and savings fees, require fewer documents 
to open accounts, impose lower minimum loan amounts for SME and consumer loans, charge 
lower fees on SME loans, need fewer days to process loans, and are more likely to accept loan 
applications through non-traditional channels such as phone or Internet.   
Focusing on ownership, we find that foreign banks appear to charge higher deposit fees, 
but foreign ownership is not associated with significantly higher other barriers compared to 
private domestic banks.  It is also interesting that government-owned banks, whose existence 
(despite efficiency problems) is often justified as providing access to the underserved groups, do 
not seem to have significantly lower access barriers compared to private banks in our sample.  If 
anything, government banks take longer to screen SME loan applications.  
Finally, the correlation between business orientation and barriers is mixed. While, retail, 
loan-intensive banks – those with a higher ratio of loans to assets - require lower minimum 
balances to open savings accounts and are more likely to accept loan applications through non-
traditional channels, they take longer to process consumer loan applications and require more 
                                                 
17  We also used the market share of each bank instead of log of total assets, but this variable entered only few 
regressions significantly, suggesting that it is the absolute size of banks rather than their market share that drives 
their business decisions on fees and requirements.   25 
 
documents to open a checking account. Overall, these results suggest that size is the dominating 
(i.e., most consistently significant) bank characteristic in explaining variation in barriers and that 
scale economies play an important role in determining the extent of barriers.
18   
 
  Physical Infrastructure 
While the literature has paid surprisingly little attention to the relationship between 
infrastructure, input costs and financial depth and breadth, our results suggest that the quality of 
physical infrastructure, such as electricity networks, which is associated with the costs of doing 
business for banks, can explain cross-country variation in many barriers to banking.  We use 
electric power transmission and distribution losses as percentage of output (Estache and 
Goicoechea, 2005) to gauge the association of physical infrastructure with banking barriers.       
Banks in countries with more power outages require higher minimum balances for savings 
accounts, require more documents to open accounts, impose higher minimum loan amounts, 
charge higher fees on consumer loans, take longer to process SME loan applications, and charge 
higher fees for international wire transfers.  We also used the number of telephone subscribers 
per 1,000 people as an indicator of the communication infrastructure and obtained similar results.  
However, unlike the energy loss measure, the communication indicator is likely to capture both 
demand and supply-side constraints.   
 
Contractual and informational framework 
Theory suggests that bank barriers will be lower in countries with more effective 
contractual and informational frameworks.  Banks arise to overcome information asymmetries 
                                                 
18 These results are consistent with the observation that it is the banks in the small financial systems of Sub-Saharan 
Africa that consistently impose the highest barriers on customers, arguably to recover their relatively high fixed 
costs.  26 
 
between lenders and borrowers (Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd 
and Prescott 1986), which can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. However,  
the extent to which they are able to overcome these asymmetries depends on the contractual and 
informational framework within which they operate.  Specifically, more efficient systems of 
credit information sharing allows banks to better assess loan applicants, thus potentially reducing 
reliance on non-interest screening mechanisms such as minimum loan amounts and fees, while 
increasing the possibility to use less personal application channels such as phone or Internet and 
allowing for faster processing of loans.  More effective creditor rights protection and more 
efficient systems of contract enforcement might help banks overcome problems of moral hazard 
and again allow them to rely less on non-interest barriers and to process loans faster.  However, a 
more efficient contractual and information environment might also allow banks more easily to 
accept new deposit clients.  An extensive empirical literature has shown the importance of 
effective contractual and informational frameworks for financial sector depth (see for example 
Beck and Levine, 2005).  There is empirical evidence that this relationship also holds for 
financial sector penetration and access to finance (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 
2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2005; Visaria, 2006).  
Here we explore whether the contractual and informational frameworks have a similar 
importance for bank barriers. We utilize three indicators from the Doing Business database 
(World Bank, 2006a) that measure the efficiency of credit information systems, the rights of 
creditors in the reorganization and bankruptcy of a corporation, and the cost of contract 
enforcement relative to GDP per capita.   
Our results suggest that higher barriers reflect the higher costs imposed on banks and 
their customers by an ineffective informational and contractual framework. Banks in countries 
with more efficient systems of credit information sharing are more likely to accept deposits at  27 
 
multiple locations, require lower minimum balances and fewer documents to open accounts and 
allow for loan applications to be submitted through non-traditional channels. On the other hand, 
banks in countries with better informational environments seem to charge higher fees on 
international wire transfers. Banks in countries that more effectively protect creditors are more 
likely to allow opening of bank accounts in non-branch locations, and require lower minimum 
balances and documents to open a checking account. Banks in countries with poor systems of 
contract enforcement require higher minimum balances on savings accounts, charge higher fees 
on deposit accounts, require more documents to open accounts and impose higher minimum loan 
balances.   The significant association between the efficiency of contractual and informational 
frameworks and lower barriers to banking thus matches the positive relationship between these 
institutions and aggregate financial development or depth, established by the literature (Beck and 
Levine, 2005). We note, however, that surprisingly it is mostly the barrier to deposit services that 
are significantly correlated with the contractual and informational framework rather than barriers 
to lending services, as one would have expected from the theoretical literature.  
 
Market structure 
Theory does not suggest an unambiguous relationship between market structure and 
barriers to banking. Banks in more concentrated banking systems might either exploit their 
market power imposing higher barriers or, alternatively, might face higher incentives to lend to 
smaller, more opaque borrowers such as SMEs as they can recover investment in the relationship 
in future periods (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Further, the variation of barriers across countries 
might be affected by the dominance of government-owned or foreign-owned banks in a banking 
system; banks might impose higher or lower barriers in banking systems dominated by 
government-owned or foreign-owned banks, independent of what individual banks’ own  28 
 
ownership structure is.  Specifically, competitive pressures or the lack thereof from a 
predominantly government-owned or foreign-owned banking system can push individual banks 
towards higher or lower banking barriers.  We use data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) to 
assess the association between bank ownership and market structure and barriers to banking.   
We find some evidence of lower barriers to deposit services in banking system with 
greater foreign bank presence. Although we find that foreign banks themselves seem to charge 
higher fees than other banks, in foreign dominated banking systems fees on checking accounts 
are lower. Further, it is easier to open bank accounts, both in terms of the required documents 
and the geographic access. On the other hand, in systems that are predominantly government-
owned, bank customers face greater restrictions in terms of where to apply for loans and the time 
it takes to have applications processed is longer.  
We also find that in less contestable systems, as proxied by a higher share of new bank 
license application rejected, banks require higher minimum account balances, charge higher 
deposit fees, require more documents to open accounts, require higher minimum consumer loan 
balances and take longer to process these applications.
19  However, banks in countries with more 
concentrated banking systems are less likely to allow customers to open deposit accounts outside 
headquarters but charge lower ATM fees, impose lower minimum amounts for SME loans, and 
are faster at processing loan applications.  Hence, overall we find that contestability is associated 




                                                 
19 We also used the H Statistics as indicator of competitiveness, following the approach by Claessens and Laeven 
(2004).  However, we do not find any significant relationship of this indicator with barriers. We also tried regulatory 
indicators of formal bank entry requirements, but did not find consistent correlations with bank barriers.  29 
 
Regulatory and supervisory framework 
Bank regulation and supervision might have both a direct and indirect effect on the 
barriers that banks impose.   Some barriers such as documentation requirements might directly 
result from regulatory requirements.  In other cases, regulatory costs might be passed on by 
banks to customers.  We use three indicators to gauge the association of bank barriers with 
regulatory and supervisory policies.  First, we use the index on Banking Restrictions from the 
Heritage Foundation, a composite index of whether foreign banks are able to operate freely, how 
difficult it is to open domestic banks, what degree of regulations there are on financial market 
activities, the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government influences the allocation 
of credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance products and invest in 
securities.  Second, we use two indicators of the supervisory approach, the Official Supervision 
and Private Monitoring indexes developed by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2007).  Official 
Supervision measures the extent to which bank supervisors can intervene into banks’ decisions in 
normal and distressed times, whereas Private Monitoring measures the degree to which private 
market participants such as large creditors and depositors have the means and the incentives to 
monitor and discipline banks.   
Banks in countries with less restrictive regulatory framework, less supervisory power and 
more reliance on private monitoring have fewer barriers.  We find that banks in economies with 
more restrictions to banking freedom are less likely to allow that accounts are opened outside the 
headquarters, demand higher minimum balances to open a checking or savings account, impose 
higher fees on checking accounts, require more documentation to open deposit accounts, are less 
likely to accept loan applications through non-traditional channels, impose higher minimum 
balances on consumer loans, and are slower at processing loan applications. Banks in countries 
with more powerful supervisors impose higher checking account fees, require more documents  30 
 
to open accounts, and impose higher minimum SME loan amounts. Banks in countries where the 
private sector has a greater role in monitoring and disciplining banks demand lower minimum 
balances and fees on checking accounts, require lower minimum amounts on consumer and SME 
loans, and process these loans faster.  However, they also demand higher fees for using ATMs.  
Our findings on the association between barriers, less restrictive regulatory policies and a focus 
on private monitoring rather than powerful supervisors matches other papers that find it is 
reliance on private monitoring rather than regulatory restrictions and official supervision that 
foster financial development and efficiency (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006). 
  
 Media  freedom 
More transparent societies might allow for lower barriers to banking, as banks in 
economies where clients have more access to information might have less leeway to impose high 
barriers to banking.  More transparency might also imply a higher degree of competition, as 
customers can more easily compare products across banks.  To gauge the relationship between 
transparency and bank barriers, we use an indicator of media freedom, which measures the share 
of press outlets that are owned by the government. This indicator comes from Djankov et al. 
(2003) who show a negative association between this and other measures of media freedom with 
economic and political freedom.   
Banks in countries with lower degrees of media freedom (i.e., where a greater share is 
controlled by the government) restrict the locations where accounts might be opened, impose 
higher minimum balances to open accounts, require more documents to open checking or savings 
accounts, need more days to process loan applications, and are less likely to accept loan 
applications through non-traditional channels.  31 
 
Overall, although we cannot infer causality from cross-country data, the results presented 
in this section still have important policy implications for potential reforms to broaden access.   
They show that traditional financial sector policies such as upgrading of credit information 
systems and improvements in the contractual environment are likely to be associated with lower 
barriers, but more on the deposit than on the lending side.  However, they also underline the 
importance of non-financial sector policy reforms such as improving the general infrastructure 
and securing a free and vibrant media for lowering barriers.  While our results stress the 
importance of a competitive environment, there are no clear correlations of barriers with market 
structure. Our results also suggest that in contrast to conventional wisdom, government-owned 
banks do not impose lower access barriers, and to the contrary, in predominantly government-
owned systems bank customers face higher barriers, particularly in access to credit services. On 
the other hand, while foreign-owned banks themselves charge higher fees on deposits, a larger 
share of foreign ownership is generally associated with lower barriers, particularly in access to 
deposit services. Regulatory and supervisory policies that are less restrictive and focus on private 
sector monitoring rather than powerful supervisors are associated with lower barriers. Finally, 
our results also emphasize the importance of scale economies in enabling lower access barriers. 
Many, though not all, of these results are consistent with the literature exploring the 
determinants of financial depth.  As panel data or more in-depth data for individual countries 
become available, future work should be able to address issues of causality and to offer more 
informed evidence on the determinants of barriers. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper is the first effort to systematically document the existence of barriers to 
banking services. Using surveys of 209 banks in 62 countries, our data show significant variation  32 
 
in barriers to banking across countries.  Though not without limitations, this effort represents an 
important first step in identifying and understanding the channels through which financial 
exclusion works.  Barriers like high minimum deposit balances, minimum loan amounts and fees 
can lead to exclusion by making these products unaffordable for large shares of the population.  
For example, in our sample high fees on checking and savings accounts may effectively exclude 
more than 30 percent of the population from having a checking account in ten of our 62 
countries.  Also, strict documentation requirements and long processing times can exclude 
households and firms who cannot provide these documents or who depend on faster loan 
decisions.  Similarly, geographic centralization of deposit and loan decisions at headquarters 
reduces physical access and increases the opportunity costs for households and firms in 
accessing financial services.  
Critically, several of our barrier variables are significantly correlated with indicators of 
outreach and estimates of the adult population with access to financial services.  Specifically, 
minimum account balances and loan amounts, annual account fees, documentation requirements, 
reduced number of delivery channels for loan products and lengthy loan processing times are all 
negatively associated with lower banking sector outreach and a lower proportion of the adult 
population with access to financial sector accounts, suggesting that these are effective barriers to 
expanding access to and use of banking services in many developing countries.  
Since these barriers are likely to result from rational business decisions of financial 
institutions taking into account their business model and the environment they work in, it is 
important to understand which bank and country characteristics explain variation in barriers 
across countries and across banks.  We provide suggestive evidence that factors traditionally 
associated with greater financial depth such as upgrading credit registries and the contractual 
framework, but also non-financial sector variables such as infrastructure and free media are  33 
 
important correlates with lower barriers.  While more competitive banking systems are 
associated with lower barriers, there is no clear correlation of barriers with the actual market 
structure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, government banks are not associated with lower 
access barriers. In contrast, bank customers face higher barriers to credit services in banking 
systems which are predominantly government-owned. On the other hand, foreign banks do 
charge higher deposit fees themselves, although a larger foreign bank share is associated with 
lower barriers in deposit services overall.  Finally, regulatory and supervisory policies that are 
less restrictive and rely more on private markets rather than on powerful supervisors are also 
associated with lower barriers.  
As a first attempt at capturing quantitative measures of cross-country differences in 
barriers to banking along the dimensions of physical access, affordability and eligibility, this 
paper is complementary to other efforts to collect data on access to financial services at the 
aggregate, firm- and household levels. Research on financial access is very much in its beginning 
stages and richer data sources and in-depth analysis are needed to improve our measurement and 
understanding of access and its impact on economic outcomes.    34 
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2004  2004 2004 2004    
Albania  8.80%  1463.21 91.42% 64.24%  5 
Algeria  10.20%  1991.82 34.43% 37.08%  1 
Armenia  6.10%  985.93 59.63% 47.28%  4 
Australia  97.60%  22082.67 32.59% 33.59%  2 
Bangladesh  27.60%  401.35 56.98% 56.51%  5 
Belarus  n.a.  1701.42 74.58% 71.63%  3 
Belgium  71.80%  23213.42 72.56% 68.57%  3 
Bolivia  42.50%  1039.27 58.04% 58.87%  4 
Bosnia  Herzegovina  n.a.  1410.06 64.04% 58.96%  4 
Brazil  33.80%  3563.52 64.35% 48.61%  4 
Bulgaria  30.50%  1958.16 34.87% 31.65%  3 
Cameroon  8.90%  736.71 83.83% 81.36%  5 
Chile  70.40%  5461.71 35.50% 36.05%  2 
Colombia  21.80%  2099.44 50.48% 45.65%  5 
Croatia  52.60%  4933.67 63.42% 63.69%  4 
Czech Republic  30.30%  6137.49 43.00% 43.00%  2 
Denmark  152.00%  30734.76 72.71% 48.81%  2 
Dominican Republic  26.40%  2440.57 39.27% 42.61%  2 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  54.80%  1614.65 32.05% 32.08%  2 
Ethiopia  19.10%  131.69 93.73% 85.37%  4 
France  87.60%  23431.63 26.23% 30.08%  2 
Georgia  8.30%  879.96 85.71% 80.26%  5 
Germany  112.80%  23705.48 31.91% 23.72%  3 
Ghana  11.60%  278.46 69.49% 68.72%  4 
Greece  71.10%  11960.44 56.92% 58.36%  3 
Hungary  43.50%  5453.73 53.09% 42.43%  3 
India  32.70%  547.8 36.87% 37.75%  4 
Indonesia  21.20%  904.14 44.73% 40.38%  4 
Israel  86.40%  17787.76 36.17% 34.75%  2 
Jordan  68.10%  2000.12 83.61% 80.36%  3 
Kenya  24.50%  426.56 43.82% 47.61%  3 
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2004  2004 2004 2004    
Korea, Rep.  125.40%  12762.22 68.95% 73.54%  6 
Lebanon  n.a.  5628.37 38.00% 38.00%  3 
Lithuania  22.00%  4481.41 88.87% 86.77%  5 
Madagascar  8.50%  229.06 72.44% 74.59%  5 
Malawi  7.80%  153.58 82.36% 59.73%  3 
Malta  105.70%  9435.9 44.56% 58.34%  4 
Mexico  15.80%  6055.92 48.95% 45.74%  3 
Moldova  19.20%  399.62 40.16% 48.32%  3 
Mozambique  1.90%  275.95 48.78% 40.34%  2 
Nepal  n.a.  231.59 37.86% 42.40%  5 
Nigeria  15.90%  401.62 32.22% 29.31%  3 
Pakistan  24.90%  566.03 47.50% 44.02%  3 
Peru  18.60%  2206.33 81.88% 76.40%  4 
Philippines  32.50%  1087.92 41.84% 43.17%  4 
Romania  8.50%  2164.64 35.01% 24.66%  4 
Sierra Leone  3.90%  209.75 100.00% 100.00%  4 
Slovak Republic  29.70%  4494.83 58.12% 51.93%  3 
Slovenia  42.10%  10964.99 67.48% 70.68%  5 
South Africa  132.80%  3346.05 70.09% 69.39%  3 
Spain  115.10%  15343.24 63.75% 66.73%  4 
Sri Lanka  28.00%  961.61 52.19% 51.10%  3 
Swaziland  n.a.  1358.05 43.40% 29.19%  1 
Sweden  102.10%  28857.84 39.47% 22.43%  2 
Switzerland  157.30%  34340.34 79.57% 59.19%  2 
Thailand  96.30%  2355.99 38.36% 36.16%  3 
Trinidad and Tobago  38.30%  8501.16 40.15% 50.27%  3 
Turkey  16.90%  3196.86 50.14% 38.33%  3 
Uganda  6.10%  262.4 59.27% 46.87%  3 
Uruguay  34.00%  5925.78 48.52% 59.16%  4 
Zambia  6.50%  338.66 46.28% 34.41%  3 
Zimbabwe  n.a.  456.69 28.24% 43.45%  4 
n.a. means not available.  39 
 
























































(out of 5) 




 (out of 5) 
Albania 2.73  0.85  6.08  0.85 6.08 0.19 0.39 1.00 1.00 
Armenia 1.81  10.97  15.25  10.56 15.25 0.35  0.00  2.85  2.19 
Australia 2.59  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.16 0.10 3.00 3.00 
Bangladesh 2.00 2.28  0.89  2.28 0.79 0.00 0.00 4.57 4.57 
Belarus 2.71  0.00  0.04  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44 1.00 
Belgium 2.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.80 1.80 
Bolivia 2.00  17.40  0.81  25.44 3.93  0.83  1.78  2.53  2.33 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  2.60 0.04  0.04  0.19  0.15 0.34  0.35  1.74 1.34 
Brazil 2.44  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.00 0.81  0.03  2.67 2.16 
Bulgaria 2.02  0.59  0.88  0.59 0.91 0.14 0.00 1.72 1.72 
Cameroon 1.88  116.39  68.26  55.88 64.75 7.87  1.22  4.00  3.11 
Chile 2.42  4.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.38  0.42  4.42  1.58 
Colombia 1.93  8.78  1.22  0.00 0.18 0.78 0.56 3.08 2.25 
Croatia 2.63  0.00  1.19  0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 2.16 2.00 
Czech Rep.  2.00  0.23  1.41  0.00 1.24 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Denmark 2.32  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.32 1.32 
Dominican Rep.  2.67  2.94  0.70 0.58  0.41  0.66  0.00  2.66  1.99 
Egypt  2.00  0.35  0.00  0.18  0.18  0.40  0.07       
Ethiopia 1.92  55.41  5.50    5.11  0.00  0.00  3.77  2.14 
France                          
Georgia 2.56  0.00  33.18  0.00 8.09 0.33 0.33 1.66 1.78 
Germany  2.65  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.26  0.00       
Ghana 2.15  22.69  21.89  0.09  11.99 5.90  0.58  3.62  3.24 
Greece 1.21  0.64  1.27  0.64  1.27  0.02  0.02  2.53  2.26 
Hungary 2.53  0.14  2.04  0.00 0.82 0.17 0.00 1.55 1.00 
India 2.00  8.85  5.02  5.83  5.02  0.00  0.17  2.69  2.55 
Indonesia 2.53  9.54  3.03  6.14 0.65 2.80 0.66 3.18 2.66 
Israel 2.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  1.22     
Jordan 1.93  16.55  5.34  1.73 0.87 0.00 0.00 2.04 2.04 
Kenya 2.78  11.71  44.30  0.00  41.82 12.82  2.07  3.78  2.86 
Korea 2.11  3.32  0.01  0.00  0.01 0.06  0.00  1.94 1.20 
Lebanon 1.58  4.22  23.98  4.22 23.98  1.96 1.90 2.54 2.36 
Lithuania 2.71  0.00  1.45  0.00  1.55  0.01  0.00  1.59  1.00 
Madagascar 1.95  38.86  19.35  0.00 17.59  5.15 0.00 2.94 2.71 
Malawi 2.00  0.00  17.89  0.00 17.89  21.98  3.63 3.65 2.84 
Malta 2.00  0.22  0.71  0.00  0.68 0.00  0.00  3.17 3.07 
Mexico 2.18  1.11  0.62  0.90 0.67 0.43 0.18 2.80 2.18 
Moldova 3.00  0.00  13.13  0.00 8.26 0.53 0.00 2.31 2.06 
Mozambique 2.00  29.61  15.71  14.19 7.20      0.30  1.00  1.00  40 
 
Table 2: Barriers to deposit services (cont.) 
Country DEPOSITS 
  Physical 
access 




















































(out of 5) 




 (out of 5) 
Nepal 2.34  90.66  65.39  123.77 73.83  8.28  4.97  4.11  3.92 
Nigeria  2.44  106.42  22.07  0.00 1.96 0.05 0.00  3.66 1.99 
Pakistan 2.00  1.59  1.59  0.33 0.71 0.00 0.00  2.64 2.43 
Peru 2.00  1.66  0.53  0.00  0.00 1.44 0.50  2.42 1.87 
Philippines 2.00 14.54  11.88  14.54 11.88 0.00  0.00  3.17  2.20 
Romania  2.30  0.03 0.71  0.02 0.18 0.40 0.23  1.28    
Sierra Leone  1.42  51.63  44.89  8.81 43.56  26.63  0.00  4.02 3.88 
Slovak Rep.  2.08  0.12  0.79  0.10 0.79 0.18 0.01  1.47 1.51 
Slovenia 1.50  0.01  0.03  0.01 0.02 0.17 0.00  1.88 1.88 
South  Africa  2.27  0.00 1.06  0.00 0.28 2.13 0.91  3.45 3.07 
Spain  1.53  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.19 0.04  1.00 1.00 
Sri Lanka  1.80  15.76  3.54  4.77 0.84 0.73 0.00  2.62 1.00 
Sweden 1.66  0.00  0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
Switzerland 2.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00  1.14 1.14 
Thailand  2.48  6.74 0.41  0.31 0.31     1.23 1.23 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  2.00 1.37 0.42  1.28  0.49 0.35 0.00  4.29 3.07 
Turkey 2.20  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.30 0.14  3.20 2.40 
Uganda 2.00  51.12  48.62  1.73 29.52  24.88  3.37  4.00 3.00 
Uruguay 1.75  1.77  1.48  0.00 2.28 2.05 1.13  3.28 2.91 
Zambia  1.80  0.00 7.87  0.00 7.87     4.28 4.00 
Zimbabwe                          
                          
Minimum  1.21 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
5th percentile  1.53 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 1.00 
Median  2.00 0.98 1.21  0.00  0.79 0.30 0.01  2.63 2.15 
Average  2.14 12.27  9.01  5.02  7.27 2.49 0.47  2.57 2.16 
95th percentile  2.71 60.70  45.45  16.72  42.08 15.57 2.40  4.28  3.89 
Maximum  3.00 116.39  68.26  123.77  73.83 26.63 4.97  4.57  4.57 
              
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market 
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Albania  2.03  214.29  7.17 1358.23  7.33 9.64  14.50 
Armenia  2.00  14.74  1.98 860.58  0.00 4.83  7.62 
Australia  5.00  7.31 0.52 10.06  1.29 1.00  7.19 
Bangladesh  2.12  25.70  0.23 174.40  2.62 9.44  43.26 
Belarus      3.28 0.89 0.00 1.15 8.06  6.20 
Belgium 2.45  5.34  0.00 28.29  2.30 2.70  3.60 
Bolivia  2.74  109.00 3.45  795.48 3.61  5.36  9.70 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  2.73  18.54  1.47 711.11  1.10 5.36  8.86 
Brazil  4.85  1.96 3.44 8.08 2.10 1.00  3.63 
Bulgaria  3.42  14.24 1.45  95.79 2.27  4.88  13.38 
Cameroon  2.14  78.53 6.21  947.92  81.39 4.87  9.31 
Chile  5.00  8.29 0.88 121.70  1.09 3.84  13.87 
Colombia  3.47  16.40  0.97 242.96  0.09 2.51  8.22 
Croatia  3.43  3.90 1.76 22.58  1.30 2.42  4.65 
Czech  Rep.  3.13  10.22  0.70 4.96 0.70 1.00  10.84 
Denmark  5.00  0.00 2.00 0.00 2.00 0.73  1.00 
Dominican  Rep.  4.67  13.02 0.82  43.52 1.32  1.84  13.04 
Egypt  2.81  5.84 0.01 0.00   5.38  14.43 
Ethiopia  2.00  178.16 0.00  878.77 0.64  5.41  14.55 
France  4.00         4.87  10.00 
Georgia  2.46  34.53  1.40 2480.08  1.10 3.31  5.62 
Germany                   
Ghana  2.63  111.94  2.04 1448.07  1.54 9.50  29.20 
Greece  5.00  11.99 2.30  33.96 2.43  1.00  2.23 
Hungary  3.29  4.77 3.71 58.00  1.51 5.66  7.66 
India  2.44  28.79  1.19 145.17  0.84 4.17  10.75 
Indonesia 3.10  31.68     4.94  9.68 
Israel  4.58         1.00  1.79 
Jordan  2.05  147.67 1.00  445.26 1.03  2.68  7.91 
Kenya  3.27  186.42 1.84  166.44 2.10  2.52  5.66 
Korea  3.78  4.19 0.37 16.99  0.29 1.88  2.73 
Lebanon  4.60  32.95  1.05 1154.76  4.95 1.58  15.61 
Lithuania  4.25  6.31 0.71 17.54  0.67 2.41  8.62 
Madagascar 2.16 24.06  2.62 17.27  3.56 8.55  15.46 
Malawi  2.12  222.36  1.00    1.72     
Malta  4.20  19.26  0.45 355.91  0.28 1.34  5.69 
Mexico  4.20  7.54 1.81 87.80  1.61 5.01  9.86 
Moldova  2.54  31.11 2.05  71.78 1.43  1.36  4.31 
Mozambique  2.15  30.71   28.61   8.66  25.84  42 
 
Table 3: Barriers to loan services (cont.) 
Country LOANS 
  Physical 
access 





































Nepal 2.00  1153.17  0.94  2970.18  16.86  3.71  10.94 
Nigeria                   
Pakistan  3.09  146.71 0.14 234.25  0.19 20.71  33.63 
Peru 3.21  21.08  1.83  54.35 0.16  1.94  3.71 
Philippines  2.36  330.55 1.46 916.66  1.41 10.13  33.29 
Romania                   
Sierra  Leone  1.77  143.55 2.07 243.89  2.07 1.73  9.52 
Slovak Rep.  3.64  10.26    57.89  1.13  1.75  3.54 
Slovenia  2.13  1.13  1.22 5.21 0.95 1.13  3.89 
South  Africa  5.00  7.27  0.48 15.98  0.65 1.46  4.13 
Spain  5.00  9.95  1.85 19.35  1.10 1.00  1.83 
Sri  Lanka  2.90  36.10  0.34 20.56  2.09 7.34  10.04 
Sweden                   
Switzerland 3.12 0.11 0.00  11.28  0.00  1.44 3.24 
Thailand  2.00  265.43 1.43 3.21 0.94 15.49  23.74 
Trinidad and 
Tobago  4.62  7.71  1.33 8.30 1.14 1.33  7.32 
Turkey  4.15  11.83  0.95 18.57  1.41 2.94  4.61 
Uganda  2.00  205.75 2.68 3141.17  2.25 1.38  4.47 
Uruguay  2.26  32.62   32.62   8.51  31.45 
Zambia  2.00        2.43      8.33 
Zimbabwe  2.85  24.08  3.05 240.12  2.54 1.46  3.91 
            
Minimum  1.77  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73  1.00 
5th percentile  2.00  1.63  0.00 1.61 0.12 1.00  2.11 
Median  3.09  19.26  1.33 58.00  1.32 2.70  8.33 
Average  3.20  76.84  1.58 408.35  3.53 4.29  10.69 
95th percentile  5.00  239.59 3.61 1964.08  6.38 9.79  32.00 
Maximum  5.00 1153.17  7.17  3141.17  81.39  20.71  43.26 
            
n.a. means not available because the banks that responded to the survey account for less than 30 percent of the market  43 
 
Table 4: Barriers to payment services 
PAYMENT SERVICES 
Affordability 
Country  Cost  to transfer 
funds 
internationally 
(% of 250 
dollars) 
Amount of fee 
for using  
ATM Cards 
(% of 100 
dollars) 
Country  Cost  to transfer 
funds 
internationally 
(% of 250 
dollars) 
Amount of fee 
for using  
ATM Cards 
(% of 100 
dollars) 
Albania  7.70 0.00 Madagascar  4.30 0.00 
Armenia  6.14 0.07 Malawi  6.42 0.08 
Australia  8.05 0.00 Malta  5.59 0.03 
Bangladesh  1.93     Mexico     0.40 
Belarus  1.27 0.00 Moldova 11.19  0.00 
Belgium  0.12  0.00  Mozambique       
Bolivia  13.47  0.26 Nepal  7.10 0.00 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  3.79 0.01 Nigeria      0.50 
Brazil 14.85  0.11  Pakistan      0.60 
Bulgaria  5.24 0.13 Peru  6.68 0.24 
Cameroon 9.15  0.00  Philippines      0.00 
Chile     0.00  Romania       
Colombia     0.19  Sierra Leone  6.86  0.00 
Croatia  3.57 0.00 Slovak  Rep.  4.38 0.19 
Czech  Rep. 3.99 0.19 Slovenia 2.88 0.00 
Denmark  4.09 0.00 South  Africa  9.53 0.34 
Dominican Rep.  20.00     Spain  6.39  0.00 
Egypt  0.76  0.00  Sri Lanka       
Ethiopia  1.87 0.00 Sweden  8.16 0.00 
France        Switzerland  3.17  0.00 
Georgia  7.03  0.13  Thailand       
Germany        Trinidad and 
Tobago  3.74 0.05 
Ghana  14.70  0.19 Turkey  6.34 0.00 
Greece  7.42 0.00 Uganda  0.55 0.19 
Hungary 3.60      Uruguay  7.18  0.14 
India  6.49 0.00 Zambia  3.24 0.13 
Indonesia  2.83  0.00  Zimbabwe       
Israel     0.23      
Jordan 5.37  0.00  Minimum  0.12 0.00 
Kenya 8.43  0.15  5th percentile  0.89 0.00 
Korea 7.05  0.22  Median  6.37 0.00 
Lebanon 9.76  0.00  Average  6.33 0.10 
Lithuania 8.72      95th percentile  14.39 0.38 
     Maximum  20.00 0.60 
      Maximum  0.12 0.00 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Technical appendix for section 5 
 
The use of a lognormal function to model income distribution was first suggested by Gibrat 
(1931) and widely used in the subsequent literature.  Recently, Lopez and Serven (2006) show 
that the size distribution of income per capita is indeed very well approximated by a lognormal 
density function.  Specifically, they cannot reject the null hypothesis that theoretical income 
quintiles shares computed from the Gini coefficient are equal to empirically observed quintile 
shares from income-based household surveys.  
 
Log normality implies the following relationship between the Gini coefficient G, the standard 
deviation σ  of log income and the Lorenz curve L(p):   
 
σ  = √2 Φ
-1  [ ( 1 + G ) / 2 ]          ( 1 )  
 
L(p) = Φ (Φ
-1(p) - σ )          ( 2 )  
 
 
where Φ(.) denotes the cumulative normal distribution.   The assumption of log-normality thus 
implies a one-to-one mapping of the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve and therefore also a 
one-to-one mapping between the Gini coefficient and income percentiles.  We therefore can use 
the observed Gini coefficient to calculate theoretical income percentiles Pj j = 1,…,99 as follows: 
 
Pj  =  L(.01j)  –  L(.01(j-1))  j=1,…,99.         (3) 
 
Substituting in (1) and (2) yields: 
 
Pj = Φ{Φ
-1(.01j) - √2 Φ
-1 [(1+G)/2]} - Φ{Φ
-1(.01(j-1)) - √2 Φ
-1 [(1+G)/2]} (4) 
 
We can then compute income per capita yj for each percentile j as function of Pj and income per 
capita y. 
 
yj = yPj/0.01.          (5) 
 
We then multiply yj with household size to get to the average household income hj for each 
income distribution percentile. While household size is expected to vary with income level 
within countries, we do not have data available on household size distribution, and are therefore 
not able to adjust for this effect.  Finally, we compare hj j=1,…,99 with the annual checking and 
saving account fee to determine j such that 0.02*hj < account fee and .02*hj+1 > account fee.  
Income distribution percentile j thus indicates the percentage of the population that cannot afford 
checking (saving) account services.  
 
Data on income per capita and household size are from World Development Indicators and Gini 
data are from UNU-WIDER (2005). 
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Albania   2.03  2263.77  7.33  535.19  7.36  16.05 11.69 
Armenia   2.00  1042.28  0.19  234.16  9.19  9.94 10.95 
Australia   5.00  10.06  3.03  41.12  0.80  7.19 2.59 
Bangladesh   2.12  55.28  6.46  1412.52  0.18  34.55 33.48 
Belarus      7.12  1.15  0.00  1.43  7.34 8.74 
Belgium   2.45  28.29  2.30  86.18  0.95  3.60 5.24 
Bolivia   2.74  759.35  3.48  1124.84  3.48  23.26 15.03 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina   2.73  573.97  1.20  484.92  1.49  14.70 16.65 
Brazil   4.85  19.19  2.10       10.32    
Bulgaria   3.42  130.35  2.05  213.32  1.49  21.38 6.84 
Cameroon   2.14  16393.68  81.39  1544.77  5.84  12.91 16.97 
Chile   5.00       213.20  1.09   70.63 
Colombia   3.47  2131.83  0.23       11.00  5.14 
Croatia   3.43  146.24  0.94  183.04  1.17  11.89 4.53 
Czech Republic   3.13  4.96  0.70  84.65  0.60  8.05 6.66 
Denmark   5.00  0.00  1.73  0.00  1.59  1.00 4.56 
Dominican Republic   4.67  89.32  1.25  176.10  6.27  6.67 17.55 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2.81  14.61  0.35  0.00  0.01  19.29 38.72 
Ethiopia   2.00  981.67  0.64  712.65  0.68  14.55 15.00 
France   4.00            18.22  24.67 
Georgia   2.46  2345.59  1.01  290.71  0.73  5.03 4.56 
Germany                    
Ghana   2.63  1044.39  1.31  1320.35  2.01  19.07    
Greece   5.00  13.98  2.43  80.86  6.70  4.77 5.43 
Hungary   3.29  58.00  3.31  29.00  1.59  10.04 19.94 
India   2.44  57.77  0.93  145.17  0.74  19.98 9.45 
Indonesia   3.10            16.59  6.07 
Israel   4.58            1.79  12.08 
Jordan   2.05  354.70  1.03  362.27  0.95  8.16 7.24 
Kenya   3.27  193.78  1.57       5.66    
Korea, Rep.  3.78  16.99  0.29  4.19  0.37  2.73 2.36 
Lebanon   4.60  4470.83  5.40  409.00  1.95  15.61 9.26 
Lithuania   4.25  17.54  0.88  65.83  0.67  9.83 8.48 
  52 
 









































Madagascar   2.16  17.27  3.56       18.60    
Malawi   2.12  306.05  1.32  1738.08  17.37  15.39 14.16 
Malta   4.20  529.00  0.28  275.38  0.27  5.64 2.74 
Mexico   4.20  101.93  1.27  298.56  1.40  15.70 28.25 
Moldova   2.54  64216.77  1.34  428.58  1.09  7.31 3.90 
Mozambique   2.15  28.61     71.53     25.84  34.21 
Nepal   2.00    18.57  2147.93  1.00  9.53 9.50 
Nigeria                    
Pakistan   3.09    0.12  954.59  0.08  31.98 28.44 
Peru   3.21  429.43  0.16  410.39  6.50  10.63 3.81 
Philippines   2.36  920.23  1.41  763.35  4.37  44.13 12.21 
Sierra Leone   1.77  218.23  1.76  5157.40  1.00  11.53 4.66 
Slovak Republic   3.64  50.91  1.13  71.15     3.06  4.67 
Slovenia   2.13  5.21  0.38  94.90  1.30  4.19 7.60 
South Africa   5.00  15.98  0.65  142.37  0.47  2.73 5.55 
Spain   5.00  19.35  1.06  100.19  0.89  1.83 3.22 
Sri Lanka   2.90  20.56  2.29  51.64  1.83  15.57 20.61 
Sweden                    
Switzerland   3.12  11.28  0.00  22.57  0.00  3.24 1.56 
Thailand   2.00  0.00  0.55  42.74     22.46  24.59 
Trinidad and Tobago   4.62  8.30  1.24  93.03  1.02  10.41 7.50 
Turkey   4.15  74.26  1.94    2.16  13.75    
Uganda   2.00  7039.03  1.51       5.15    
Uruguay   2.26  32.62          31.52    
Zambia   2.00    2.23       10.67    
Zimbabwe   2.85  263.49  2.54       7.91    
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